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Abstract
Electoral competitiveness is a key explanatory construct across a broad swath of phe-
nomena, finding application in diverse areas related to political incentives and behavior.
Despite its frequent theoretical use, no valid measure of electoral competitiveness exists
that applies across different electoral and party systems. We argue that one particular
type of electoral competitiveness – electoral risk – can be estimated across institutional
contexts and matters most for incumbent behavior. We propose, estimate and make
available a cross-nationally applicable measure for elections in 22 developed democ-
racies between 1960 and 2011. Unlike extant alternatives, our measure captures vote
volatility and is constructed at the party (not system) level, exogenous to most policy
predictors, and congruent with the perceptions and incentives of policy-makers.
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Electoral competitiveness is simultaneously one of the most central and mismeasured
constructs in the study of democratic politics. In a recent five-year period, approximately one
in every second issue of the American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political
Science and Journal of Politics published an article related to electoral competitiveness.1
Equally as notable, due to the absence of a conceptually coherent and cross-nationally valid
measure, a large majority of them (21 of 29) were single-country studies while the remainder
either employed a measure of a related but different concept from electoral competitiveness
(such as democracy or institutional proxies), an invalid measure, or did not include a measure
at all.
Lacking a cross-nationally valid measure of electoral competitiveness, scholars have re-
sorted to conceptually and empirically imprecise devices such as typologies (Sartori, 1976), id-
iosyncratic single-country measures (Ranney, 1976), institutional proxies (Hobolt and Klem-
mensen, 2008; Schleiter and Voznaya, 2012), or ordinal categorizations such as the Executive
Index of Political Competitiveness (Beck et al., 2001). Alternatively, scholars can employ
broader measures of democracy that may correlate with electoral competitiveness (e.g., Pem-
stein, Meserve and Melton, 2010; Gugiu and Centellas, 2013) or sets of covariates, each of
which capture some component of competitiveness (e.g., Immergut and Abou-Chadi, 2014).
Many of these measures are at the system-level of analysis and static. None are capable of
capturing small changes in competitiveness in a single measure for a ruling party.2
The failure to develop a generalizable measure of electoral competitiveness poses not only
a challenge for model identification but a challenge for understanding the consequences of
different forms of democratic governance. Politicians elected in competitive settings pur-
portedly respond more to their median constituents (Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart,
1See the table in the Supporting Materials.
2A notable exception to these rough measures are the more recent and focused com-
petitiveness measures estimated by Grofman and Selb (2009) and Blais and Lago (2009).
Whereas the other alternatives are too broad, however, the Grofman-Selb measure may be
too narrow for general applications, as it is specifically designed for turnout models. The
Blais-Lago measure is at the district, not national, level.
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2001; Powell, 2000), moderate their partisan preferences in fiscal policy (Sole´-Olle´, 2006),
and provide better, more and more timely public goods (Adsera`, Boix and Payne, 2003;
Hecock, 2006). Voters, for their part, purportedly hold representatives more accountable
(Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan, 2002), turn out to vote in greater numbers (Powell, 1986;
Selb, 2009) and weigh both incumbent performance (Koch, 1998) and issues (Lachat, 2011)
more when elections are competitive. In combination with other innovations in political
measurement, theoretically important relationships can also be tested for the first time
cross-nationally. Are more compact party systems (Alvarez and Nagler, 2004) more elec-
torally competitive? Does greater transparency (Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2014)
make incumbents less secure? A valid cross-national measure of electoral competitiveness
should not only operationalize a central political concept but help to gauge its effects in
numerous policy domains across multiple institutional and political contexts.
1 Electoral Competitiveness
1.1 Conceptual Definition
Ideally, a useful cross-national measure of electoral competitiveness should provide, above all,
(a) conceptual clarity but also (b) a unit of analysis matching the actors, i.e., no system- or
country-level measure, (c) consideration for electoral volatility (not just, say, vote margins),
(d) a direct connection to the loss of power, (e) an interval-level scale and, in order to support
policy analysis, (f) congruence with the executive’s perspective on his or her political security.
We begin by proposing a conceptually clear and ultimately operationalizable definition of
one type of electoral competitiveness, electoral risk, that meets the above criteria. We define
electoral risk as the expected probability that the plurality party in parliament
loses its seats plurality in the next election.3 Thus we capture a conceptually simple
3Other scholars have arrived at similar definitions for an ideal measure of electoral com-
petitiveness (Boyne, 1998) but we, to the best of our knowledge, are the first to estimate it
as a single variable.
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construct of great importance to the dominant policy-maker, regardless of context, that
is forward-looking and likely to influence behavior. At lower and higher loss probabilities
(LPRs) plurality parties should be less responsive to the electorate since modest changes in
vote share are unlikely to cost or win them a seats plurality, respectively.
Why focus on the plurality party? As the largest party in parliament is almost always
entitled to the first attempt at forming a government, prime ministers are usually from
the largest party. In our OECD sample (see below), prime ministers are from the largest
party in 82% of the elections, and this figure rises considerably further when only the first
governments formed after an election are considered.4,5 Retaining this post matters in all
electoral and party systems because it entails agenda setting powers. The consequences of
losing plurality status do differ across systems. In two-party systems, losing plurality status
in parliament almost inevitably means leaving government while in multi-party systems with
coalition governments, this is not necessarily the case. Nevertheless, in both systems, losing
a seats plurality and the prime-ministership is an eventuality that large parties do their
utmost to avoid.6 Minority governments do not differ in this incentive either: a party that
loses the legislative plurality can expect to lose the prime minister’s office. Thus, leaders
in single-party majority, coalition and minority governments all have a strong incentive to
retain their seats plurality. We can expect that leading parties in an electorally competitive
setting, regardless of government type, may behave differently in office than those in a non-
competitive system.
4Technocratic governments are an obvious exception.
5We also estimate loss probabilities for a presidential system and a few semi-presidential
systems. The incentive to retain a plurality in the lower house of the legislature may weaken
but it nevertheless remains.
6We choose to emphasize seats plurality rather than majority as some scholars have ad-
vocated (see, for example, Elkins (1974)) because we are looking to capture the objective of
individual parties that translates across systems. A majority is often not realistically attain-
able for a single party in a multiparty system. Plurality status provides important, albeit
different, benefits to a party in both systems. Indeed, one early effort at conceptualizing
inter-party competition defined success with a varying ‘magic number’ of votes that would
confer largest party status across autocracies and various forms of democracies (Przeworski
and Sprague, 1971).
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Electoral risk, as we define it, is a function of two elements: the expected variability in
national-level party vote share; and the manner in which changes in a party’s vote share
produce changes in its legislative seat share. The first depends on political and economic
events; politicians, we argue, predict the probability of given vote swings in the upcoming
election by observing the volatility of voters’ electoral support for plurality parties in past
elections. The second component, the seats-votes elasticity, depends upon a country’s elec-
toral rules and the particular geographic distribution of each party’s voters. Parties whose
electoral support is based on districts won by large margins, for example, will enjoy a lower
seats-votes elasticity, as a given swing in the vote will not translate into as large a swing in
seats (Chen and Rodden, 2013). Together these factors determine the expected probability
of an election outcome, as seen from the perspective of newly elected leaders contemplating
the security of their position against future electoral swings. Because we estimate our loss
probabilities from the perspective of the first day after an election, our measure, in contrast
to many political variables, enjoys exogeneity from many potential policy-related dependent
variables.
No measure is without limitations and we note ours up front. We seek to replicate the
calculations of a the head of a plurality party, i.e., the likely prime minister, immediately
following an election. For actors to believe past election swings to be predictive of future
swings, we must assume a reasonably stable party system. For this reason, we limit our
measure to developed democracies.
2 Data and Operationalization
The focus of this article on one type of electoral competitiveness, electoral risk, compels
us to restrict our sample to countries with consolidated party systems. Democracies with
party systems in which major parties do not continue to exist over consecutive elections are
difficult to analyze. To this list of excluded states, we also add those in which the possibility
of election-based executive replacement is ruled out. For example, rotating executive powers
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between parties preclude the use of Switzerland. The country sample that we employ here
consists of the standard set of developed countries — the 24 members of the OECD in 1990,
minus Turkey and Switzerland — but we note that the potential sample of countries for our
measure is much larger.7
Our calculation of loss probabilities, as we discuss below, depends on (a) seats-votes
elasticities and (b) past vote swings. Newly elected leaders, we argue, look at both the
district-by-district competitiveness of elections that influence how large a seat swing could
result from a small swing in vote share as well as at past swings in vote share to develop
a sense of electoral security. Seats-votes elasticities depend on patterns of contestation
between multiple parties across electoral districts and, hence, require district-level data in
SMD countries. In PR countries, we treat the whole country as a single district.8 We have
been able to collect district-level data back to 1945 for most SMD countries.
We also need data on a number of historical elections before we can calculate loss prob-
abilities for a given election year. As we discuss below, we calculate the loss probabilities
from past vote-share swings by way of kernel density estimation. Of course, the accuracy
with which we can calculate the loss probabilities depends on the number of data points. We
use only the six previous elections for the density estimation both because this maximizes
our sample size and because elections even further in the past are less likely to remain in
political memory. Consequently, the first six elections after a transition to a new electoral
system, as was the case in Italy (1994), Japan (1996), and New Zealand (1996) must be
omitted. France did hold one election under proportional rules in 1986. In this case, we
simply assume that politicians in the restored majoritarian system overlooked this election
to infer vote volatility. Fortunately, electoral system changes are rare.
7We provide detailed information on our data and sources in our online appendix.
8Note, however, that some research has shown interesting districting effects under PR.
See, for example, Monroe and Rose (2002).
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2.1 Loss Probabilities
The first step toward estimating the perceived loss probability of new prime ministers is
to calculate the party-specific seats-votes elasticities. Based on the geographic distribution
of party support across electoral districts and patterns of party contention, how great an
increase (decrease) in seat share would result from a uniform one-percent increase (decrease)
in vote share? We build on an innovative new method of calculating such elasticities by
Linzer (2012a).9 Linzer employs finite mixture distributions fitted to district-level election
returns. This produces a very close approximation of the underlying distribution of party
electoral support across districts. His method then repeatedly samples from this multimodal
distribution to produce a large series of hypothetical election outcomes. When taken to-
gether, the results of this simulation produce an estimate of the number of legislative seats
each party should expect to win for plausible shifts in their national-level vote share. The
slope of this seats-votes relationship reveals the relative concentration or dispersion of a
party’s vote support in the populace, and thus its insulation from or vulnerability to future
swings in the vote share. For a hypothetical one-percent change in their national vote share,
parties with a high concentration of voters in districts will tend to gain (or lose) few seats,
while parties with voters spread more evenly over districts will tend to gain (or lose) many
seats. Stated slightly differently, the smaller the shift in national vote share needed to gain
one additional seat, the greater a party’s geopolitical advantage. For France, where parties
compete independently in the first round but form alliances for the second round, we use
second-round party groupings instead of parties as our unit of analysis as detailed in the
online appendix.
We estimate seats-votes elasticities only for parties in SMD systems, assuming that seats-
votes elasticities are equal to one for all parties in PR systems (see also Linzer, 2012a, fn. 1,
p. 401). Orlowski (2014) has empirically confirmed this assumption for multiple parties in
9Thankfully, he has made this procedure available in an R library (Linzer, 2012b) called
seatsvotes (Linzer, 2012c).
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each of nine PR democracies with Linzer’s method. We additionally illustrate this regularity
by estimating seats-votes elasticities near unity for a limiting case, Spain, and a more typical
case, Austria. Spain, which hosts a proportional electoral system with relatively low district
magnitudes, many regional parties and overrepresentation of large parties has been described
as “proportional representation with majoritarian outcomes”(Hopkin, 2008).10 It is one of
the most likely PR states to deviate from a S-V elasticity of one. Austria employs a high
threshold (4% of the national vote) for a party to enter parliament but its effects are largely
offset by second-tier compensatory mechanisms. As we show in our online appendix, Linzer’s
method estimates an S-V elasticity of nearly one for the major parties in both countries.
Once seats-votes elasticities have been estimated from district-level data, we turn to the
question of loss probabilities. From a new incumbent’s perspective, the best estimate of
the seats-votes relationship in the next election is the observed relationship between seats
and votes from the most recent election. Given this measure of geopolitical support for the
incumbent’s party and that of competitors, what is the probability of a vote swing occurring
that is sufficiently large to displace the leader’s party as the largest in parliament?11 For this
to happen, the seat share of a party that is not presently the largest would have to exceed
that of the presently largest party. Calculating this probability thus requires a distribution
of the joint seat swings of both the largest and second-largest party.12 The probability of the
largest party being displaced at time t + 1 is the probability of the swing in the seat share
gap between the two largest parties exceeding the seat share gap at time t in which the seat
swing, st, is calculated as follows.
st = ∆v1,tτ
∗
1 −∆v2,tτ ∗2 , (1)
10a.k.a., the “electoral sweet spot” (Carey and Hix, 2011).
11Note that we assume that the prime minister comes from the largest party.
12Calculating the probabilities that the third, fourth and even smaller parties become the
plurality party in the next election is possible but unnecessary. When a new party gained a
plurality in our sample, it was the second largest party 97.4 percent of the time.
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where ∆vi,t, i ∈ {1, 2}, represents the aggregate-level party vote share differential between
time t + 1 and t. In particular, ∆vi,t = vi,t+1 − vi,t. The τ ∗i are the estimated seats-votes
elasticities from the most recent election and are therefore not indexed by time. Substan-
tively, by not indexing the seats-votes elasticities, we assume that a new incumbent assumes
that the geographic distribution of support remains as it is presently when looking back in
time to estimate the probability of removal in the next election. By subtracting ∆v2,tτ
∗
2 from
∆v1,tτ
∗
1 , st is defined as the seat swing against the incumbent.
Of course, incumbents at time t cannot know their party’s vote share or that of the
second-largest party at time t+ 1, so they have to rely on a proxy measure. We assume that
incumbents draw on the experience of previous plurality parties to assess vote volatility.13
More concretely, after an election, on the first day of a new government (assuming that
it forms soon after an election), the leader of the largest party in parliament assesses the
probability of the party losing its plurality with a hypothetical question: Given the current
distribution of geographical support for parties across districts and the vote
volatility in recent elections, what is the probability of an electoral swing costing
my party its parliamentary plurality?
We calculate st for all available election years in our data set and use the distribution of
joint seat swings from time 1 to t− 1 to approximate the probability of a large enough seat
swing to displace the current plurality party at the next election at time t + 1.14 For that
purpose, we need a function that maps the sequence of historical seat swings to a probability
density, which we can then integrate to calculate the likelihood of a sufficient seat swing to
displace the plurality party. More formally, we need:
g : {sn}t−11 → f(s). (2)
13Some authors (e.g., Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Tavits, 2005) have associated electoral
volatility with electoral systems. Recent work by Bischoff (2013) dispells concerns that
electoral systems might have a direct effect on volatility.
14Vote shares from t, the election in question, are included in t − 1 because it measures
change.
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Given the small number of elections we can draw on to derive f(s), g needs to be a function
that smoothes the distribution, which is why we use a kernel density function for g, such
that
g(x) =
1
nh
n∑
i=1
K
(
x− xi
h
)
, (3)
where h > 0 is the bandwidth, and K is the kernel function, which we assume to be Gaussian,
such that
K(u) =
1√
2pi
e−
1
2
u2 . (4)
This kernel density represents an estimate of seat swing probabilities between the two largest
parties, as informed by historic vote swings and the current geographic distribution of party
support. We then use the density to calculate the probability of the largest party losing its
plurality (loss probability or LPR). More specifically, we calculate the area under the kernel
density up to the critical value in the domain that is equal to or greater than the seat share
gap between the two largest parties. Thus, the new incumbent’s expected loss probability is
LPR =
∫ −d
−∞
g(x) dx (5)
where d = (ts1 − ts2)/
∑n
i=1 tsi is the difference (from the perspective of party 1) between
party 1’s total seats (ts1) and party 2’s total seats (ts2) divided by the total number of seats
in parliament (
∑n
i=1 tsi).
In the online appendix, we provide a figure, which shows the distributions of loss prob-
abilities for the case of Austria for different specifications of the kernel function (Gaussian,
Epanechnikov, rectangular, triangular, biweight and cosine) as well as different bandwidth
specifications [Silverman’s (1986) rule of thumb and Sheather and Jones’s (1991) pilot esti-
mation of derivates]. The differences in LPR distributions across different specifications are
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negligible.
[Table 1 about here.]
[Figure 1 about here.]
Table 1 presents the mean and standard deviations of the plurality party loss probabilities
for elections between the seventh election after 1945 (1960 for the US House, approximately
1970 for many others) and 2011. As the box plots in Figure 1 also show, loss probabilities
exhibit considerable variation between and within countries. On average, single-member
district systems display higher loss probabilities than proportional systems. Extremely high
and low LPRs suggest lower levels of electoral competitiveness. An LPR of .5, approximately
the median for pre-1996 New Zealand, is the most competitive.
3 Validity
Validity testing for a variable designed to measure the electoral vulnerability of the largest
party in the legislature as perceived right after an election is not straight-forward. An ad-
vantage of a measure built from past vote swings and the seats-votes relationship from the
recently concluded election is that it is likely exogenous to political and economic develop-
ments that occur within a term. A drawback is that the many events in the years between our
LPR measure and the next election make outcomes in the next election a poor benchmark
for construct validity. The best validity measure is likely the association with governance
outcomes since they follow from the executive party’s perception of electoral vulnerability
and are more temporally proximate to the time of measurement. We use cross-national price
levels as such a governance outcome.
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3.1 Price Levels
Work by Rogowski and Kayser (2002) has suggested that countries with majoritarian elec-
toral systems, ceteris paribus, enjoy real price levels approximately ten percent lower than in
their proportional counterparts. The mechanism that they espouse but do not directly test
is electoral competitiveness (see Chang, Kayser and Rogowski (2008); Chang et al. (2011)).
Greater electoral competitiveness in SMD systems incentivize politicians to tilt regulation
in favor of consumers rather than producers, thereby lowering prices.
We test the effect of our measure of electoral risk (LPR) on real price levels in Table 2
but we also take the opportunity to examine what we believe to be the two most common
alternative measures used in the literature, vote margins and seat margins. Vote and seat
margins report the difference between the top two parties in their vote and seat shares,
respectively. Although they are indeed informative of a the largest party’s electoral vulnera-
bility, neither margin measure performs well cross-nationally because of a failure to account
for volatility. What constitutes a safe margin in the Netherlands where volatility in vote (and
seat) shares is generally low would promise little electoral security in Canada where volatility
is high. Volatility also poses a challenge for margins as a measure of electoral security when
it changes over time with a country. Indeed, one of the most famous debates in Ameri-
can politics, over implications of the “vanishing marginals” in the US Congress (Mayhew,
1974), was shown to be essentially a measurement problem when Mann (1978) and Jacobson
(1987) demonstrated that larger vote margins did not translate into safer seats because vote
volatility had increased. Indeed, scholars have noted the importance of vote volatility to
measuring electoral competitiveness even before Mayhew (Przeworski and Sprague, 1971)
and, more recently and empirically, in contexts outside of the US (Bodet, 2013).
[Table 2 about here.]
We test the cross-national validity of loss probability, vote margins and seat margins
by regressing real price levels on them in a pooled panel dataset that covers 22 OECD
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countries, 1970 to 2010.15 Like the Chang, Kayser and Rogowski (2008), we include the
relevant controls identified in the “Law of One Price” literature. Electoral competitiveness
should be greatest at middling values of loss probability. An incumbent party sure to win or
sure to lose need not cater to the interests of votes as closely. We add the square of LPR to
capture this non-linearity. We assume that the values for LPR for non-election years are the
same as the value for the most recent election and, because we are interested in cross-national
effects, we omit country fixed effects.
Neither vote nor seat margins exhibit a statistically significant relationship with real
prices in Table 2. Loss probability (LPR), in contrast, demonstrates a substantively and
statistically significant effect. Figure 2, based on Model 1, plots out predicted real price
levels over different loss probabilities, holding all of the variables other than LPR and its
square at their means. Results conform to theoretical expectations. Prices are lowest where
elections are most competitive (LPR ≈ .5) suggesting that politicians to tilt regulatory
policy in favor of consumers where electoral competition is greatest.
[Figure 2 about here.]
3.2 Plurality party change
As mentioned above, our loss probability (LPR) measure is primarily designed to match
the perceived electoral risk of the plurality party in the legislature, most often the prime
minister’s party, immediately following an election. The absence of alternative measures of
this concept make construct validity difficult. Our primary claim to measurement validity
rest, first and foremost, on the theoretical match of our method to the information that the
plurality party leader would have and value. The next best validity test is the ability of our
loss probability to explain outcomes that have been linked to electoral competitiveness in
the existing literature (as shown above in Section 3.1). Nevertheless, a measure of perceived
15Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
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electoral risk should be at least weakly related to election outcomes, even though they occur
several years later. For such a comparison, we plot LPR against the probability of change
in the seats plurality party, as defined by Equation 6.
∆PPT =
(
T∑
t=1
It
)
/T, where It =
 1 if PPt 6= PPt−10 otherwise (6)
In particular, the probability of change in the plurality party, ∆PPT , is the number of
times there was a change in the plurality party between the first recorded election and the
election of interest, T , over the number of elections up to and including election T . We
expect that plurality parties experience more competitive pressure in countries with a high
∆PPT ; hence, if LPR is to reflect competitive pressure for plurality parties, it should have
a positive relationship with the probability of change in the seats plurality party. Figure 3
confirms that LPR passes that test. 16
[Figure 3 about here.]
A binary logit equation can offer a similar test, albeit with the advantage of predicting
individual election losses of plurality status with the preceding loss probability. Applying
this to the same data associates a unit change in loss probability with a 32-fold increase in
the odds of a change in the plurality party in parliament.17
4 Conclusion
We propose and estimate what we believe to be the first cross-nationally valid measure of a
key type of electoral competitiveness, electoral risk. Both measurement (e.g., Selway, 2011)
16Of course, pooled data like in Figure 3 do not necessarily mean that plurality party
change is associated with higher loss probabilities in individual countries. We confirm that
this is indeed the case in a figure in the Supporting Materials. In only one of the 22 sample
countries – Greece – are loss probabilities lower when a plurality party changes due to an
election.
17 pr(change=1)
pr(change=0)
= −2.011 + 3.45LPR + . N=279, s.e.=.663, z=5.21; e3.45 = 31.567
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and estimation methods (e.g., Rozenas, 2012) have notably improved in the study of politics
in recent years. The measurement of electoral competitiveness, however, has lagged until
recently, leaving scholars conducting cross-national research with a poor set of inadequate
proxies. Unlike extant alternatives, our measure incorporates vote volatility, is specific to
the largest party party in the legislature (not to the whole system), exogenous to most policy
predictors, and designed to capture the perception and incentives of policy-makers.
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Country Rank Mean LPR Rank SD LPR Electoral System
Australia 1 .4965294 8 .1893283 SMD
Austria 15 .2041149 15 .1607144 PR
Belgium 4 .4030591 12 .175925 PR
Canada 5 .3603264 14 .1613548 SMD
Denmark 19 .0842332 18 .1394477 PR
Finland 16 .1795604 9 .188086 PR
France 11 .3116623 3 .2577968 SMD
Germany 9 .3229848 1 .2726855 PR
Greece 10 .3139305 13 .1660727 PR
Iceland 18 .1175663 22 .1003214 PR
Ireland 20 .079271 19 .1284448 PR
Italy 17 .1291531 16 .1568425 PR
Japan 22 .0683625 23 .060517 PR
Luxembourg 14 .2235547 17 .1527407 PR
Netherlands 8 .3258293 11 .1827887 PR
New Zealand 2 .4415718 6 .1963949 SMD
Norway 21 .0746939 21 .1243041 PR
Portugal 7 .3355697 10 .1873746 PR
Spain 3 .4263818 4 .2354869 PR
Sweden 23 .0463855 20 .1268431 PR
UK 6 .3401079 5 .2273151 SMD
USA 12 .2541187 7 .1951658 SMD
Table 1: Means and standard deviations of plurality party loss probabil-
ities, 1960-2011, by country. Time series for Japan and New Zealand
stop at their electoral system changes in 1994 and 1996, respectively.
21
(1) (2) (3)
Loss Probability Vote Margin Seat Margin
LPR -28.471∗∗∗ (6.630)
LPR2 31.421∗∗ (10.260)
V oteMargin 7.988 (6.825)
SeatMargin -3.741 (3.448)
GDP per Capita 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Imports -0.311∗∗∗ (0.039) -0.331∗∗∗ (0.041) -0.342∗∗∗ (0.041)
lnPopulation -1.039∗∗ (0.392) -1.427∗∗∗ (0.384) -1.432∗∗∗ (0.377)
GDP Growth -1.133∗∗∗ (0.192) -1.060∗∗∗ (0.194) -1.026∗∗∗ (0.192)
∆ExchangeRate -0.448∗∗∗ (0.038) -0.479∗∗∗ (0.041) -0.476∗∗∗ (0.041)
USAInflation 2.371∗∗∗ (0.215) 2.268∗∗∗ (0.220) 2.263∗∗∗ (0.221)
1980s -2.882∗ (1.426) -4.720∗∗ (1.459) -4.610∗∗ (1.459)
1990s 1.421 (1.690) 1.288 (1.747) 1.376 (1.746)
2000s -14.776∗∗∗ (1.975) -16.435∗∗∗ (2.056) -16.574∗∗∗ (2.064)
Constant 101.352∗∗∗ (7.651) 102.969∗∗∗ (7.852) 104.580∗∗∗ (7.711)
N 833 887 887
R2 0.658 0.652 0.652
Adj. R2 0.653 0.648 0.648
Table 2: Real price levels and three measures of electoral competitiveness. Standard errors
in parentheses. p∗ < .05; p∗∗ < .01; p∗∗∗ < .01.
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Figure 1: Box plots of plurality party loss probabilities.
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Figure 2: Predicted price levels for given loss probabilities.
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Figure 3: Loss probability (LPR) plotted against plurality party change
probability, ∆PPT (see Equation 6) with least-squares line and loess
smoother. N=267. OECD sample, 1960-2011.
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